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AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: IS THE ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVELY HARNESSING INTERNATIONAL POWER?
We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.
President George W. Bush 1 The President's words are a clear articulation of strategic concepts (ways), and take account of the fact that the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) will require the pooling of resources (means) by many nations to accomplish U.S. national objectives (ends). This thread of international cooperation is woven throughout the National Security Strategy (NSS), with three of the eight concepts listed in the overview focused on strengthening alliances, working with others, and developing agendas for cooperative action. 2 Through cooperative efforts, the international community of nations should be able to harness far more resources to put towards combating terrorism than one nation can alone. Despite the clarity of the NSS, there is much international debate as to how effectively the administration has pursued those concepts.
An analysis of the administrations actions thus far, will find that while their strategy is correct, they have performed poorly in harnessing the power of the international community for action against terrorism. The administration appears to have taken a rather narrow approach in its proclivity to focus on the military element of power. This over reliance on military power, particularly to the detriment of international cooperation in other elements of power, resulted in unbalanced ends, ways and means, and consequently increased the risk to achieving the stated strategy. For the U.S. to effectively implement its NSS, it must successfully employ the full spectrum of national power against global terrorism.
BACKGROUND

STRATEGIC ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS
An effective strategy implements balanced ends, ways and means to accomplish strategic aims. As stated in the NSS, U.S. ends (defeat global terrorism) and ways (collective international power) appear reasonable. However, they must be taken in context with the finite means available to do the job. The administration's clear enunciation in the NSS of the requirement to maximize collective efforts to accomplish strategic GWOT objectives demonstrates an understanding of the shortfalls in U.S. means (military force structure) available to do the job. President Bush's first term presidential campaign speeches inferred that he already viewed the military as over-stretched by the Clinton administration's proclivity for nation building and peace operations. 3 As the administration calculated means available for advancing the war on terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq, they received clear advice from then
Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki's estimate of several hundred thousand soldiers, 4 and RAND Corporation's estimate of 500,000, 5 for post-conflict operations. The administration's leadership appeared to be well advised of the significant force requirements required to undertake their ambitious course of action. However, they appear to have lost sight of that significant aspect as they started down the road to war with Iraq.
AFGHANISTAN VERSUS IRAQ
Building a coalition for the attack on the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan was straightforward. With the attacks of September 11 still fresh in everyone's mind, U.S. allies immediately signed on to support the efforts to bring the perpetrators of those attacks to justice. With little diplomatic effort, the administration built a coalition of forces from within existing alliances around the world. Additionally, the availability of the Northern Alliance and Pashtun Tribes in Afghanistan meant that the U.S. could fight that campaign with a limited commitment of U.S. forces. 6 The campaign by most accounts was a huge success, with relatively little civil unrest following conflict termination, and continued global commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan. Perhaps this initial success, and the relative ease with which the world rallied around the nation's cause, gave the administration too much confidence as they approached their next campaign in Iraq.
Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the administration's leadership put forth significant diplomatic efforts to obtain a supporting resolution through the United Nations (UN) Security Council to gain legitimacy for its preemptive campaign in Iraq. This time they were less successful -something was different. Although the linkages between the attacks of September 11 and Afghanistan were clear, many in the world community did not see the same linkages to Iraq. Worldwide debate raged during the months leading up to March 2003, and continues today about the merits of preemptively going to war to topple the regime of Sadam Hussein, and liberate Iraq. This paper will not discuss the merits for the respective sides to the argument; it will instead look at the results as they apply to the means available to accomplish the strategic objective.
STRATEGIC IMBALANCE
It is imperative that strategic leaders understand the clear relationship between endsways-means, and the inherent risks associated when there is imbalance between them. The Department of Defense's June 2002 fact sheet listed more than fifty countries providing overt support to the U.S. led GWOT. 7 It is noteworthy that only twelve of the fifty provided support to OIF, while all supported Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). 8 These numbers have, and will continue to fluctuate over time, but they clearly remain heavily skewed towards supporting OEF.
That disparity speaks volumes about the limited level of global commitment gained by the administration's diplomatic efforts. When you view this discrepancy in light of the previously cited troop estimates, the noticeable impact of this diplomatic failure is telling. There is a disproportionate over commitment of U.S. military ground forces (not to mention U.S. dollars) to an operation that many would argue, should be a collective burden shared by most nations.
The inability of the administration to achieve diplomatic success increased the imbalance of U.S. means available for stability and support operations (SASO) in Iraq, and increased risk to the success of the operation, as clearly hi-lighted by the growing insurgency.
U.S. diplomatic failures have actually reduced commitments from some nations. Many members of the international community now view U.S. intentions as imperialism, where they should see instead an overwhelmingly united international counter-terrorism agenda. 9 The perception that the U.S. has "Iraqified" the war on terrorism, followed by subsequent attacks against OIF contributors like Spain, led many governmental leaders of normally friendly nations to go out of their way to distance themselves from U.S. GWOT efforts for fear that their countries will suffer a 9/11-like attack on their homelands. 10 These outcomes are indicative of the administration's failure to effectively employ diplomatic power to achieve a united international effort. The combination of over commitment of U.S. forces and significant erosion of international cooperation for the war on terror will make it more difficult to execute future campaigns that serve U.S. interests. While the administration remains committed to achieving its long term goals in Iraq, it could have avoided this predicament if it had applied more international assets to the problem set up front. Perhaps more importantly for future campaigns in the war on terrorism, the U.S. lost the initiative in building international momentum towards fighting the GWOT.
ELEMENTS OF POWER
A strategy applies resources across broad concepts to achieve objectives. At the national level, these broad concepts are known as elements of national power, which are exhibited in a nation's diplomatic, information, military, and economic policies, programs, and actions. Every nation uses these elements of power to pursue their national strategic ends.
While some nations have a good balance among their elements of power, most have real strength in only one or two areas. The world recognizes U.S. strength in military and economic power, as it applies significant national means to ensure its strength in those areas. However, it has not expended the same level of resources to achieve similar strength in diplomatic and information power. GWOT is a different kind of war, a war of ideas, with seeds sewn by ideologies and economic disadvantages, then accordingly, the U.S. should increase funding significantly for its diplomatic and international assistance programs. In so doing, the U.S. may find another way to enlist the support and cooperation of other states and international organizations, increasing the means to achieve U.S. objectives.
MILITARY POWER
Though recent results seem pessimistic, there are also some positive outcomes representing real opportunities to move forward in the war on terror. One of those opportunities is the acceleration of the U.S. military transformation effort. 13 The immediate impact of the September 11th attacks, and subsequent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, resulted in significant budget increases for the U.S. Armed Forces. There are opportunities to leverage these additional funds to accelerate transformation actions within the services. The Army for example, is rapidly transforming it's combat formations to a brigade combat team centric structure, which will increase it's current strength of 35 brigades to at least 43 more deployable, more lethal brigade combat teams over the next 4 years, and greatly improve the Army's strategic flexibility. 14 Transforming U.S. military forces will make them more efficient, and in a sense increases the means available to fight the nation's wars. However, OIF has made it clear that the U.S. will have to continue to rely on other nations to provide military means/capabilities to the problem set if it is to achieve its national objectives. Traditionally, the U.S. has built and maintained formal alliances and informal coalitions to do just that.
The U.S. needs to reassess alliances to ensure that they meet changing national requirements. The nation's current alliance structure was formed to meet national interests built around the containment of the Soviet Union and China. Kurt M. Campbell, writing "The End of Alliances? Not So Fast," The Washington Quarterly, categorizes those relationships as the nuclear family (nations protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, on the front lines with the Soviet Union/China), the extended family (nations that provided a long term foothold in regions to blunt Communist expansion), and friends and acquaintances (nations that provided opportunities to limit Communist encroachment on a transitory basis). 15 With the breakup of the Soviet Union, and China's current state of affairs, the U.S. is no longer focused on blocking Communist expansion. Nonetheless, the U.S. has not succeeded in reshaping its alliances to meet the requirements of the GWOT. The U.S. needs to retain those alliances that still have merit as structured, transform those that are capable of adapting to GWOT requirements, and discard those alliances that are no longer relevant, nor willing to change, as a drain on precious resources.
NATO is an excellent example of a transforming U.S. alliance. While those potential gains are important, they are military power centric, and are not the sole solution. Despite current international animosity with respect to the invasion of Iraq, significant opportunities to increase means through growth in international cooperation in the other elements of power are present. These opportunities will require a significant shift on the part of the administration to begin to restore balance to the means and ways at hand.
Specifically they must invest considerably more resources to increase the scope and use of the diplomatic, economic, and information elements of power.
DIPLOMATIC POWER
Spurred by the U.S.'s limited multi-lateral approach to the invasion of Iraq, there is significant movement in the world community to find and fix systemic flaws in the UN's structure.
This movement has occurred at international and regional levels in governmental organizations such as the UN and the European Union (EU), as well as in think-tank institutions such as the East-West Institute. If the U.S. can capitalize on that movement, the administration can make considerable strides in rebuilding international cooperation for the counterterrorism effort.
Most countries, and importantly many people within those countries, view the UN as a legitimate international organization. "The UN has the moral authority to focus global attention, establish consensus goals and summon the international community to respond." 17 It is for that reason alone that the U.S. should not discard it as an institution. In fact, the Bush administration understands very well the capabilities and limitations of the UN, and works within that framework to achieve national interests. Recent developments in Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan hi-light the important role the UN plays as a legitimate international organization.
The U.S. continues to work through the Security Council to curb nuclear ambitions in Iran, and help resolve the humanitarian crises in Sudan. In Afghanistan, the U.S. successfully sought UN expertise in establishing and executing their first free elections. These are but a few examples of the administration using its diplomatic power to influence the UN, an international body, to achieve national goals. The administration must exert more diplomatic power in the coming years to develop international support (transformed into international action) to allow the nation to reduce, and ultimately eliminate its military role in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When viewed from this perspective, the UN has been, and must continue to be a key component of U.S.
strategies for any future military operations. 18 The necessity of leveraging UN assistance in achieving U.S. interests is clear. It is also clear that the UN is not currently functioning efficiently to handle the complexities of the GWOT, and its non-state actors.
The growth in this realization has created common themes across a broad spectrum of organizations. There is apparent consensus that the UN as a body is apathetic towards finding real solutions to the terrorism problem. From failing to agree to a common definition of terrorism, to giving more attention to the excesses of counterterrorism actions, many view the UN as abdicating its role as a world leading organization. Change to reassess their performance thus far in leading efforts to counter the growing problems of worldwide terrorism, and recommend changes to ensure they remain relevant for the future. 21 The panel, with an experienced international membership (former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft served on the panel), was chartered to assess threats to international security, evaluate current UN policies and institutions, and recommend changes for shaping the UN to provide collective security in the future. 22 In December 2004, the UN published proposed reforms designed to better enable the organization to deal with modern security challenges to include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, In the area of terrorism, the report outlines measures to promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, improve the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, assist member states in meeting counter-terrorism obligations, and establish sanctions for state noncompliance with counter-terrorism resolutions. 25 Importantly, it offers for the first time a uniform definition that describes terrorism as . . . any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) , that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
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This definition is significant because it eliminates caveats that permitted some member states to give "freedom fighter" status to entities recognized by most of the world as terrorists. It should lead to an internationally recognized, uniform list of known terrorist organizations, enable the international community to unite against those entities, and lend legitimacy towards any nation that acts against them.
Another key proposal in the report is the proposed methodology for authorizing "anticipatory self defense" through the Security Council. The report acknowledges that the nature of terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has created a new problem where threats, though not imminent, are still significant and real. In an effort to curb unilateral actions though, it proposes the Security Council act as an authorizing agent, viewing the issue from the perspectives of seriousness of the threat, proportionality of the response, exhaustion of alternatives, and balance of consequences. 27 This proposal requires serious consideration, as it offers a way to pursue preemptive war and achieve international legitimacy through the authority of the UN Security Council. Many states in the international community view any preemptive war as illegitimate because the current UN Charter does not specifically authorize such measures. Had the charter been amended as proposed, the U.S. might have achieved greater support for legitimizing OIF from member nations that adhere strictly to the wording of the charter. Of course, the obvious down side to this proposal is the current right of veto, allowing this mechanism to be stalled by a member state with veto authority, leading us to the same impasse seen before OIF anyway.
In Americans wanted to spend closer to one dollar on foreign aid for every three dollars on defense. 31 Increasing U.S. foreign aid and encouraging other wealthy nations to do the same will increase the effective use of global economic power to eradicate the economic seeds of terrorism.
Awareness within the international business community of their role in contributing to defensive economic power in the battle against terrorism is growing. In November 2003, more than 300 business leaders met in Brussels at an East-West Institute conference on worldwide cooperative efforts to improve security against the threats posed by terrorism. As infrastructure owners, the international and transnational business participants looked for security solutions in the areas of cost sharing, infrastructure upgrades, and improved business processes. 32 These business leaders understood the collective economic power they bring to the table, and appeared committed to assisting governments in the defense against terrorism. This represents a unique opportunity for the U.S. and other governments to leverage private investments to expand the economic element of power and increase its effectiveness in defending against terrorism.
As the world's largest economic power, the U.S. should lead the effort to pursue international and regional agreements that best use collective economic power to multiply the effectiveness of its efforts against terrorism. The administration should foster government/business partnerships to share costs while achieving solutions for defending against terrorism. Maximizing the means available to develop functioning economies in failing states is critical to eliminating a key recruitment motivator for terrorists. The U.S. needs to set the example by increasing national expenditures on foreign aid considerably, and then push the international community to formulate a common strategy for solving the economic disparity of disadvantaged states. Success in increasing effects of economic power should reduce the current necessity for military power solutions in the long term.
INFORMATION POWER
There is a great need for the U.S. to communicate its intentions and goals, and to share GWOT intelligence information more effectively. There are many parts of the world (including the Middle East) that are suspicious of U.S. intentions, and are therefore not very receptive to U.S. information campaigns. However, the U.S. can do better, even in those tough-to-sell regions. Surely, the nation that successfully manipulated public opinion behind the Iron Curtain can figure out a way to communicate with equally repressed audiences in the Middle East and other depressed regions of the world. 33 Evidence that the administration is not communicating its foreign policies very well is abundant. At a recent East-West Institute conference, American, European, and Russian participants expressed concern with the lack of clarity to key points of U.S. foreign policy. One U.S. participant for example, questioned whether the administration really knew what its goals are in Iraq, as its policies seemed to be in a continuous state of flux. 34 Part of the administration's communications problem stems from the use of the term "war" when speaking about terrorism. Many U.S. allies, particularly European and Middle Eastern, do not think of themselves as being in a "war" on terrorism. They focus predominately on how to "contain" terrorism, not defeat it.
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The U.S. should lead the effort to establish a set of international standards, or a common language. As previously mentioned, the UN High-level Panel's proposal would codify terrorism in a manner that does not allow the perception of terrorism as a legitimate form of resistance or freedom fighting. With this definition, the UN sends a strong message to states and international actors that it will no longer quibble on the issue of terrorism. If the UN were to adopt, and enforce this definition through resolutions, sanctions, and use of force authorizations, it would achieve a unity of effort against the global terrorism movement. That in and of itself would be quite an accomplishment, and would enable the international community to speak with one voice and focus on the adversary. This unity would create a powerful message that can help those nations and organizations sitting on the fence in the GWOT to lend legitimacy to their decisions to join international efforts to fight global terrorism. The more nations that get off that fence on the correct side of the GWOT, the more means will be contributed internationally to help achieve the nation's strategic ends.
Perhaps not surprising to those who have examined international perception of U.S. • Issue a presidential policy directive, establishing a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security Council (NSC).
• Work with congress to establish legislation and funding for an independent strategic communication research and development center.
• Redefine the role of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy.
• Raise public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State to the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary.
• Designate the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the DOD focal point for strategic communication.
• Require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components. 38 The intent of those recommendations is two fold. First is to increase the precedence and funding levels of strategic communications positions within the government. Second, and most important, is to increase the ability of the NSC to synchronize policy, diplomacy, military operations, and communications operations, achieving synergy across the spectrum of national power. This is imperative if the U.S. is going to halt the downward spiral of domestic and international perceptions towards U.S. actions abroad in general, and more specifically with respect to the GWOT. In a global battle of ideas, information operations may well be the U.S.'s true main effort.
One only has to recall the 2004 presidential campaigns to understand that national leadership knows very well how to use the power of information. The U.S. should work to harness that same level of energy across the full spectrum of information operations in the GWOT. By doing so, the nation's leaders can certainly manage to put forth a more coherent, persuasive, and unifying message to the international community. Increased information power will enable the international community to motivate nations to contribute their fair share towards achieving a solution to terrorism, and de-motivate those nations that sponsor terrorists. If the international community begins to speak to terrorism problems/solutions with a unified voice, then the message received by terrorists will be one that foreshadows a unified approach towards their destruction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to rebalance NSS ends, ways, and means in the GWOT, the U.S. must regain international support for its efforts, and provide considerable resources to harness the international community's diplomatic, economic, and information power. To that end, the U.S.
should:
• Increase significantly the funding for diplomatic and international assistance programs to strongly signal the international community of U.S. commitment to solving the underlying support structures of the global terrorist movement.
• Reassess current alliances to ensure that they meet changing national requirements. Retain those that still have merit as structured, transform those that can change to meet GWOT requirements, and discard those that are no longer relevant, or are not willing to change.
• Capitalize on the momentum in the world community, and the UN High-level Panel's recommendations for changing the UN, and lead the effort to transform the UN into a viable international organization capable of meeting international security challenges.
• Support the UN's proposed definition of terrorism, establishing a set of international standards, or a common language, and enhancing global unity of effort against terrorism.
• Capitalize on its position as the world's largest economic power to lead the effort in building international and regional cooperation to maximize collective economic power, multiplying the effectiveness of international efforts against terrorism.
• Increase U.S. foreign aid and encourage other wealthy nations to do the same, thereby increasing global economic power as an effective instrument for the eradication of the economic seeds of terrorism.
• Foster cost sharing partnerships between governments and international/transnational businesses to achieve economical solutions for improving security of critical infrastructure against terrorist attack.
• Adopt the recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications to unify national information operations under one umbrella, and apply significant resources towards halting the downward spiral of perceptions towards U.S. actions abroad in general, and more specifically with respect to the GWOT.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. is the most capable country in the world when it comes to having the means to exercise power, whether military, diplomatic, economic, or information. Even so, those means are not without limits. The NSS clearly articulates a plan for achieving victory in the GWOT, by making it an international collective effort. Unfortunately, the administration has not succeeded in achieving international support and action, resulting in a significant reduction in available international resources. The administration, like those before it, has also not fully invested in, nor employed all the elements of national power to achieve a balanced effect. This imbalance in ends, ways, and means has stalled the international communities unified efforts against terrorism that were so prevalent immediately following the September 11 attacks, reduced the effectiveness of U.S. actions, particularly in Iraq, and increased the risk of strategic failure in that country. If the U.S. fails in Iraq, it will lose its initiative in the current war on terrorism, and credibility in its ability to lead the international community in future efforts.
The U.S. can rebalance its strategy and reenergize the international community by increasing its commitment to its other elements of power through increased investment of resources. The U.S. must harness the diplomatic power of the international community by working to constructively change the UN, reform common ties with traditional allies, and create new alliances/coalitions where necessary to eliminate the growth of terrorism. The administration must increase focused foreign aid expenditures, work with other wealthy nations to do the same, and leverage the cost sharing capabilities of international/transnational businesses to enable disadvantaged nations to achieve some semblance of economic prosperity and stability. National leadership must also harness international information power to communicate more effectively, articulate clear strategic goals and intentions, develop an international common language that speaks of terrorism with one voice, and motivate other nations to do their fair share in the war on terrorism.
The administration must not only act in congruence with its national strategy, but must also work harder to legitimize that strategy in the eyes of the international community. If the nation rebalances investment in all its elements of power, and the President can get the international community's elements of power working collectively, harnessing their vast resources, the effects can be exponential, and the defeat of global terrorism assured.
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